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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, regulation of banks has focused on the risk
entailed in bank loans. Loans are typically nontraded
assets. In recent years, another component of bank assets
has become increasingly important: assets actively traded
in the financial markets.1 These assets form the “trading
book” of a bank, in contrast to the “banking book,” which
includes the nontraded assets such as loans. Though for
most large banks the trading book is still relatively small
compared with the banking book, its rising importance
makes the market risk of banks an important regulatory
concern. 
In January 1996, the European Union (EU)
adopted rules to regulate the market risk exposure of
banks, setting risk-based capital requirements for the trad-
ing books of banks and securities houses. At this point, one
must ask what the purpose of such regulatory capital is.
We proceed under the hypothesis that the purpose of regu-
latory capital is to provide a buffer for contingencies
involving large losses, in order to protect both depositors
and the system as a whole by reducing the likelihood that
the system will fail. In this paper, we look at two different
ways of calculating bank capital for market risk exposures
and compare their performance in delivering an adequate
cover for large losses.
The approach taken by the EU is to use a “hard-
link” regime that sets a relation between exposure and
capital requirement exogenously. The adopted require-
ments, known as the standardised approach, laid down
rules for calculating the capital requirement for each
separate risk category (that is, U.K. equities, U.S. equi-
ties, U.K. interest rate risk, and so on). These are added
together to give the overall requirement. A weakness of
this method is that it does not take into account the
diversification benefits of holding different risks in the
same portfolio, and thus yields an excessive capital require-
ment for a large diversified player. One way to correct for
this problem is to use the value-at-risk (VaR) models that
some banks have developed to measure overall portfolio
risk. The Basle Supervisors’ Committee has now agreed to
offer an alternative regime, with capital requirements
based on such internal VaR models, and the EU is consid-
ering whether to follow suit.
While the measure of risk exposure employed by
the two regimes is different, in both approaches the reg-
ulator lays down the parameters for the calculation of the
capital requirement for a given exposure. Thus, both
regimes embody a hard link.
Arupratan Daripa is a lecturer in the Department of Economics at Birkbeck
College, and Simone Varotto is an analyst in the Regulatory Policy Division of
the Bank of England.138 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
Under VaR, the capital requirement for a particular
portfolio is calculated using the internal risk management
models of the banks.2 For any portfolio, the aim is to
estimate a level of potential loss over a particular time
period that would only be exceeded with a given probabil-
ity. Both the probability and the period are laid down by
the regulator. Basle has set these at 1 percent and ten days,
respectively. The capital requirement is based on this
potential loss.3
But using VaR comes at a price. The regulator
must try to ensure that the internal model used to calculate
risk is accurate. Otherwise, banks might misrepresent their
risk exposure. However, back-testing to check the accuracy
of an internal VaR model is difficult in the sense that a
large number of observations are needed before an accurate
judgment can be made about the model.4 This motivated
economists Kupiec and O’Brien (1997) of the Federal
Reserve Board to put forward a new “precommitment”
approach (PCA) that proposes the use of a “soft link.” Such
a link is not externally imposed, but arises endogenously.
In the case of the proposed precommitment approach, the
link between exposures held and the capital backing them
is induced by the threat of penalties whenever trading
losses exceed a level prespecified by the bank (known as the
precommitment capital).
Specifically, under PCA, banks are asked to choose
a level of capital to back their trading books for a given
period of time (for example, one quarter). If the cumulative
losses of the trading book exceed the chosen cover at any
time during the period, the banks are penalised, possibly
by fines. The chosen capital is thus a “precommitment”
level, beyond which penalties are imposed. The task of the
regulator is to choose an appropriate schedule of penalties
to induce a desirable choice of cover for each level of risk.
The banks then position themselves in terms of risk and
capital choices for the trading book. The idea is attractive
because it does not require the regulator to estimate the
level of trading book risk of any particular bank or to
approve the firm’s model, and it promotes a more “hands-
off”regulation.
2. AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FRAUD
This paper examines whether principal agent problems
between the shareholders and the managers in banks would
undermine the use of a capital regime relying on incentives
for the shareholders.5 In particular, it looks at whether the
management might choose to run positions that were
excessive relative to the capital of the bank. This is not a
question of illicit activity such as the hiding of positions,
which no capital regime will deal with, but whether the
managers, because of concerns about market share, their
own bonuses, etc., might on occasions take excessive risk.
For example, a very large position might be taken on the
assumption that it could be treaded out of in minutes.
Hard-link regimes avoid this issue because the positions
taken at any time must be consistent with the amount of
capital available to back them according to a formula laid
down by the regulators. There is no scope for judgment by
the managers. The scope for such judgment is an advantage
in PCA. Depending on the effectiveness of the incentives,
however, it could also be a weakness.
3. HARD LINKS AND SOFT LINKS: 
A POTENTIAL TRADE-OFF
PCA not only circumvents the problems of back-testing,
but also gives the banks much greater freedom in choosing
the portfolios they wish to carry. Since the trading desks
of banks are likely to be more adept at estimating risks of
various trades, it seems inefficient to impose hard links.
While these advantages of PCA have been dis-
cussed in the literature, another aspect of this soft-link
approach seems to have received little attention. The flexi-
bility of a soft-link approach such as PCA comes from the
fact that it is not directly prescriptive, but creates incen-
tives through the use of penalties. In more general terms,
PCA tries to solve what is known as a “mechanism design”
problem. It attempts to specify a mechanism (in this case,
a penalty framework that the banks take into account
in choosing portfolio risk and committed capital) that
would make it incentive-compatible for the banks to
choose the socially desirable risk profile. The success of
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anticipates the strategic opportunities that a mechanism
might create.
In other words, while soft-link approaches are
flexible and not subject to measurement problems, they
create a host of strategic issues. To build a successful soft-
link regulatory policy, one must recognise all possible
conflicts of interest that might arise subsequently, and
provide incentives to align them with the objectives of
the regulator.
The first step toward building an optimal soft-
link policy is to analyse the incentive effects of PCA in a
detailed model of the conflicts of interest within the bank.
An example of such a model can be found in Daripa and
Varotto (1998a).
In Daripa and Varotto, we find that switching to
PCA from a hard-link approach does entail a trade-off. On
the one hand, the switch would allow firms greater scope to
choose portfolios that were appropriate given their exper-
tise and market liquidity. On the other hand, the switch
could also increase the likelihood that large players have
insufficient capital to cover market spikes. One issue is
whether key features of the soft-link approach could be
combined with certain features of a hard-link approach in
order to circumvent certain incentive problems. 
4. SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP 
AND CONTROL IN LARGE BANKS:
THE AGENCY PROBLEM
A large part of the corporate finance literature explores the
corporate control problem. The problem is empirically well
documented and theoretically well understood. The typical
solution to agency problems is to use incentive contracts
(see, for example, Gibbons and Murphy [1992], Jensen and
Murphy [1990], Garen [1994], and the survey by Jensen
and Warner [1988]). A corporate control problem arises
whenever ownership is separate from the decision-making
body. In many large corporations, ownership is diffuse and
decisions are taken by managers.
As in most large corporations, an integral feature
of large modern banks is the separation of owners from
day-to-day decision making. The ownership is diffuse—
there are numerous small shareholders who have little
impact on most decisions. For example, in the United
Kingdom, shareholders rarely have more than 2 to 3 per-
cent of the shares in any one bank. Even relatively large
shareholders would in general have hardly any impact on
day-to-day risk taking. It is the incentives of, say, the
traders of the bank that determine what specific strategies
they might adopt on a particular day. Thus, it is important
to see to what extent the owners can control their actions.
However, in regulating banks, scarce attention
has been paid so far to such internal control problems
and their effect on the success of the regulatory mecha-
nism. There is a good reason for this lack of attention.
Regulation usually takes the form of an exogenous speci-
fication for capital for each level of estimated risk carried
by the bank (combined with some form of inspection to
ensure that the rules were adhered to). As Daripa and
Varotto (1998a) show, regulation by such a hard link is
not sensitive to agency problems.6 But this is no longer
true when we consider a soft-link approach. In Kupiec
and O’Brien (1997), the regulator interacts with banks
intended as homogenous entities. Shareholders and man-
agers are not considered as separate centres of interest.
This leaves aside the important issue of the effects of the
incentive structure within the bank. Indeed, under
PCA, the generation of the right incentives is at the
very heart of the problem. Thus agency-related control
problems become central issues and must be addressed
in order to gain a clear understanding of the regulatory
incentives that would be generated.
As a control device, the owners write contracts
with managers, and then the managers make the most of
the trading decisions. Moreover, managers cannot usually
be fined (that is, paid negative salaries) in the event of a
loss.7 Thus, decisions about trading-book risk are taken by
managers with limited liability, while the owners have to
suffer the losses in the trading book and pay the penalty in
the case of a breach under PCA.
This fact implies that to study the effectiveness
of the incentive structure generated by PCA, it is no
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whose actions are influenced directly by the regulatory
incentives. Without explicitly modeling the agency
structure and the nature of optimal incentive contracts in
the bank, the effect of regulatory policies on large banks
is difficult to gauge.
In other words, to evaluate a soft-link regulatory
scheme, the appropriate question to ask relates to the effect
of the regime on the incentive structure within the bank.
An analysis of this question would tell us which regulatory
objectives are filtered through, and what aspects of the reg-
ulatory mechanism need further modification. In this
paper, we aim to provide such an analysis.
5. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
In Daripa and Varotto (1998a), we investigate the above
issues in a simple principal-agent framework. We obtain
the following results.
5.1 AGENCY INCENTIVES UNDER 
A HARD-LINK APPROACH
First, we show that conflicts of interest within the bank8
have no implications for hard-link policies. The regulator
sets a capital requirement for each level of estimated risk.
At any point in time, the risk cannot exceed the level con-
sistent with the given capital. It is easy to see that this is
true irrespective of the incentive structure in the bank.
Clearly, when regulators are relying on models specified by
the firms to generate capital requirements there may be
some scope for managers to produce results that downplay
the losses. But the managers’ scope is severely limited. The
regulators lay down the amount of returns data that must
be used (one year minimum), the parameters used in the
model, and approve the model. The regulators also carry
out back-testing.
So, while a hard-link regime such as VaR is subject
to measurement problems—as highlighted in the litera-
ture—and is economically unattractive in some respects,
the presence of a hard link does manage to sort out some
potential strategic complications. A hard link works
because it sets an exogenous requirement that cannot be
breached.
However, the estimated risk under VaR uses
fixed parameters and does not take into account extra
information about, say, future market liquidity that
might be available to the manager. The estimated risk
also fails to reflect managerial expertise in choosing hold-
ing periods optimally, given the opportunity set. Thus,
the VaR estimate may often be an overestimate. Of
course, an overestimate provides even better cover for
extreme losses; at the same time, however, it cuts off cer-
tain investment opportunities inefficiently. 
5.2 AGENCY INCENTIVES UNDER PCA
While the structure of an agency would be a concern under
any soft-link regime, the precise effects would differ across
different soft-link policies. In this paper, we analyse the
effects of agency on the outcomes generated by PCA. 
Under PCA, the capital chosen does not constrain
the manager’s choice of riskiness. Even if the shareholders
used an internal model to monitor risk, they would not
want to cut off too many investment opportunities. In fact,
they would like to rely on the judgments of the manager in
order to reap the benefits of his expertise. Instead of put-
ting a priori constraints on portfolios, they would want to
link payment to “performance.”
In the absence of a priori restrictions on the
choice of risk, the outcome depends on the manager’s
preferences, because even with the use of a VaR model
the manager could choose the holding period according
to expected market liquidity or price volatility. We
show that if managers care only about monetary com-
pensation, the principal (that is, the bank owner/share-
holders) could design contracts that would generate
incentives for the manager to behave consistently with
the principal’s objectives, and in turn, the regulator
could therefore achieve the right capital levels. But the
manager might also be interested in nonmonetary
rewards (for example, attaining star status by generating
large positive returns) and might therefore undertake
high-risk strategies (limited managerial liability
implies that only the upside matters). In Daripa and
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on the manager can be achieved only at the cost of the
principal’s own profit. This leads the principal to choose
a level of control that is not too tight, resulting in a
nontrivial probability of very risky investments and
large losses in relation to the amount of capital pre-
committed.
6. MODIFYING PCA: OPTIMAL 
REGULATION
Correcting for agency distortions is, in general, not
straightforward. This is a problem of designing a mecha-
nism to implement a certain objective given that various
interacting agents have conflicting preferences.9 Such a
general approach could be very fruitful in this context.
While devising a suitable approach is one of our research
areas, an analysis along this line is beyond the scope of
the paper.
However, there is another possible route—since
the interaction between the regulator and the banks takes
place repeatedly over time, we need not focus simply on
static regulation. The key problem here is that on the one
hand, maintaining flexibility makes it necessary to allow
the banks to choose their own riskiness. On the other hand,
such flexibility might result in loss of control by the prin-
cipal over the manager. A hard link is inflexible, but it
allows full control.
A loss of control occurs when managers of different
types have different preferences for portfolio risk. In view of
this, we might attempt to retain the flexibility and yet
harden the soft links under PCA in the following manner.
Consider the following scheme for any given bank:
• Regulate according to PCA to start with. 
• In any future period t, if there has been no breach in
period t-1, regulate according to PCA. 
• If a breach occurred in period t-1, adopt a hard-link
approach for T periods (if VaR is econometrically
problematic, adopting the standardised approach
would do just as well—as would any other hard-link
regime that puts limits on managerial risk taking). At
the end of T periods, switch back to PCA.
Such a scheme would help eliminate the agency
distortion. The reason is that the manager must trade off
risk today with risk tomorrow.10
Suppose the manager puts a large weight on port-
folio risk. Suppose he takes a very high-risk strategy in
period t and large losses occur. In a static context, limited
liability implies that the manager would not care about the
losses. But now there are other consequences. Since the man-
ager puts a large weight on risk, unless he discounts the
future heavily, he would care about the risk he can undertake
in period t+1 and after. Higher risk in period t increases the
chances of facing a hard-link regime for T periods that
would put limits on managerial risk taking. Thus, there is
now a trade-off. This helps reduce the agency distortion. 
The policy is simple enough—a violating bank
must go through a “probationary” phase during which its
risks would be very inflexibly controlled. This approach
maintains the flexibility of PCA, while hardening the links
on punishment paths.
In future research, we hope to explore these issues
further and shed light on optimal regulation.142 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 NOTES
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Paper series, as well as comments by our discussants Jean-Charles Rochet and
Paul Kupiec at the Financial Regulation and Incentive Conference at the Bank
of England. We are grateful to all of them.
1. For example, securities and foreign exchange or commodities
positions that are held for short-term trading purposes.
2. The value at risk of a given portfolio can be calculated via parametric
or nonparametric (historical-simulation) models. Parametric approaches
are based on the assumption that the distribution of future returns
belongs to a given parametric class. The historical-simulation approach
produces a time series of profits and losses that would have occurred if the
portfolio had been held over a specified estimation period.
3. The Basle rules specify an additional multiplier of three, which is
applied to the results of the VaR model to convert it into a capital
requirement.
4. See Kupiec (1995) and Jackson and Perraudin (1996).
5. This paper is a summary of the results derived by Daripa and Varotto
(1998a). Readers interested in a more formal discussion should refer to
that paper.
6. With this we do not mean that hard-link regulation prevents man-
agers from undertaking fraudulent activities. An implicit assumption in
our analysis is that managers act legally.
7. Even when fired, most managers are usually able to find other jobs.
8. Clearly, if they do not degenerate into fraudulent actions on the part
of the manager.
9. For a lucid discussion of the central issues in the implementation
literature, see the survey by Moore (1992).
10. Of course, such a scheme would work only if the expected duration
of the manager’s employment were not very short.REFERENCES
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